Australian Embassy and Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Vienna
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Agenda item 5(f): NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Chair  

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of Canada, New Zealand and my own country, Australia.   

We thank the Director General and the Department of Safeguards for the most recent report under this agenda item. Unfortunately, the situation it outlines remains deeply concerning.  

While Iran has provided the Agency with access on some occasions to facilities which were not affected by military strikes, on many other occasions it has failed to allow such access – thereby preventing the Agency from conducting requested verification activities.  

As the report makes clear, allowing the Agency to access declared facilities for verification activities is a legal requirement for a State with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.  Picking and choosing when to provide such access undermines a central tenet of the safeguards regime. 

In relation to the facilities affected by military strikes, the situation requires constructive cooperation between Iran and the Agency. The Director General has emphasised his disposition to work with Iran to ensure full compliance with Iran’s obligations. We regret that, despite the Director General’s intensive efforts to identify a constructive path forward, Iran has still not provided the Agency with the special report required under its safeguards agreement. As a result, no verification activities have been conducted at these facilities. The Agency has lost continuity of knowledge of the previously declared inventories of nuclear material at these facilities, including most alarmingly Iran’s stockpile of high enriched uranium. Verification of this material is now long overdue, having not taken place for five months. As the report indicates, this is a matter of serious concern – and of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement.  

Restoring the implementation of safeguards at these facilities is a matter of the utmost urgency. The Agency has made clear that it has the necessary expertise to safely conduct verification at these facilities – but the essential first step is for Iran to provide the required reporting. It is critical that Iran does this without further delay.  

Chair 

We commend the Director General and his team for their continued efforts to engage with Iran in the current challenging circumstances. At the last meeting of this Board, we noted the announcement of the agreement reached in Cairo between Iran and the Agency. Regrettably, Iran’s actions since then have continued to fall far short of what is legally required. We urge Iran to change course and enable full and effective resumption of Agency verification at all nuclear facilities, consistent with Iran’s safeguards agreement – implementation of which cannot be suspended under any circumstances. 

Iran’s lack of full cooperation with the Agency and its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement are not new, as outlined by the Board resolution adopted in June. Iran remains legally obliged to implement Modified Code 3.1, yet refuses to do so. Iran’s lack of transparency regarding the additional enrichment facility, Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, and regarding its large stockpiles of enriched uranium raises grave concerns.  

Chair 

In the current context, the Agency’s objective, technical reporting to this Board on Iran’s nuclear program is as important as it has ever been, providing crucial information to the international community on a matter of serious non-proliferation concern. We reiterate our continued support for the Agency’s vital work in relation to safeguards and verification in Iran, and call on all Board members to reinforce the Agency’s mandate in this regard. We again underline that threats or personal attacks against the Director General or Agency staff are entirely unacceptable.   

Chair  

Our countries continue to support a diplomatic solution to address the serious international concerns that exist regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear program.   

We again thank the Director General for the report under this item, and his update on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of Security Council resolution 2231, and ask that both be made public.   

Thank you, Chair.