69th Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference
AUKUS Trilateral Right of Reply – Item 23: Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT
Delivered by H.E Ambassador Ian Biggs, Head of Delegation and Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
19 September 2025
Thank you, President
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of AUKUS partners: Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
President
I refer colleagues to the General Conference document GC(69)/25 circulated on 12 September which reiterated our concerns regarding the addition of this political agenda item by one Member State. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States do not support the inclusion of this agenda item.
We had not sought to take the floor during this politically motivated and unnecessary agenda item. However, the serious mischaracterisations we have just heard require us to respond.
President
We recognise that there are genuine questions amongst Member States regarding naval nuclear propulsion programs in Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement states. We remain committed to transparency and we continue to engage openly. As in previous years, Australia has delivered an update to this year’s General Conference, through our national statement during the General Debate, on our program to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. AUKUS partners have also provided updates at every regular meeting of the Board of Governors since the AUKUS partnership was first announced.
The Director General has made it clear that he will continue to keep Member States informed on developments in his engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs. As the Director General’s latest report on Australia’s program confirms, Australia continues to provide the Agency with all information required under its safeguards agreements, and the Agency continues to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program.
President
We regret that this agenda item, both here and at the Board, continues to be used to cast doubt on the Agency’s clear authority to negotiate directly and in-confidence with Member States on safeguards implementation. As confirmed by the Director General’s clear statements on this topic, the Agency’s engagement with Australia in this regard is entirely within its mandate, under its Statute and safeguards agreements approved by the Board of Governors. It is important that Member States continue to reject all attempts to undermine and politicise the IAEA’s independent, technical mandate – on which we all rely.
It is untrue that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a Nuclear-Weapon State to a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State runs counter to the NPT or its spirit. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners’ respective international obligations, including under the NPT, Australia’s CSA and AP, and Australia’s obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
Australia’s submarines will be conventionally armed. Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The UK and the US have not, and will not, provide any assistance, encouragement or inducement to do so.
Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, and accompanying infrastructure in Australia, will be fully sovereign. Any suggestion otherwise is false.
AUKUS partners have made clear our commitment to ensuring that the non-proliferation approach for Australia’s program, including an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s CSA, sets the highest non-proliferation standard.
As we have said previously, we are not seeking to establish a model arrangement for others. Australia's arrangement, once finalised, will enable the IAEA to continue to fulfill its technical objectives: verifying there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.
The Director General has made clear that, in due course, the Article 14 arrangement will come to the Board for appropriate action; as we have stated, AUKUS partners fully support this approach. At that time, we expect it to be judged on the basis of the Director General’s technical assessment.
President
Once again, I must express our regret at having to intervene under this unnecessary and politicised agenda item. We will continue to welcome discussion of naval nuclear propulsion programs in the Board, under apolitical items proposed by the Director General, when he judges appropriate, and guided by his technical assessments.
Thank you, President.