IAEA Board of Governors Meeting
Agenda Item 15: Any other business - Right of reply
10 June 2022
Thank you Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to comments made today regarding Australia’s effort to acquire conventionally-armed, nuclear powered submarines.
We reiterate that Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States remain fully committed to our respective non-proliferation obligations. Our cooperation under AUKUS will reflect our longstanding leadership in global non-proliferation. As the Director General noted in his opening statement, he is satisfied with our engagement and the transparency shown by AUKUS partners to date.
Chair,
We continue to consult the IAEA Secretariat, as is appropriate and proper, to discuss relevant arrangements – with a determined focus on ensuring that we set the highest possible non-proliferation standards, including through comprehensive engagement with the Agency.
As we have noted on previous occasions to the Board, verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from an Australian naval nuclear propulsion program will proceed within the framework of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
Naval nuclear propulsion is compatible with Australia’s safeguards obligations and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement – like all such agreements – specifically envisages such activities.
Chair,
I will not repeat all of the points made in our statements already delivered. I will, however, address some of the factual inaccuracies and points we have heard today.
I note the assertion that the IAEA and AUKUS partners should not be permitted to engage on naval nuclear propulsion. Not only is such engagement appropriate, but there is a firm legal basis as reflected in Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Statute for the IAEA Secretariat to engage Australia and the other AUKUS countries on questions relevant to the prospective use of nuclear material by Australia in naval nuclear propulsion. As the Director General noted in his opening statement, he is satisfied with our engagement and the transparency shown by AUKUS partners to date.
Regarding comments that Australia’s acquisition of naval nuclear propulsion is not consistent with the NPT. This is not true – the NPT does not prohibit naval nuclear propulsion. The AUKUS countries remain fully committed to the NPT, will comply with their respective obligations under it and other relevant instruments, and, in undertaking this cooperation, will implement the strongest possible non-proliferation standards.
Once again, we do not agree with any proposal to establish a ‘special committee’ or so-called ‘inter-governmental process’ for in-depth discussions on Australia’s acquisition of naval nuclear propulsion. Such a proposal is unnecessary, as nuclear propulsion-related cooperation under AUKUS will be undertaken consistent with Australia’s safeguards obligations.
Thank you, Chair.