IAEA Board of Governors
Agenda item 5: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)
6 March 2024
Statement by Ms Sarah Goodall, Alternate Resident Representative of Australia to the IAEA
Chair
Australia continues to support the non-proliferation objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We extend our continued appreciation to the Agency for its professionalism, impartiality and dedication in respect to its crucial work in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Chair
We note with concern that there has been no further progress by Iran in implementing the commitments it made in the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023.
We regret the fact that Iran has yet to reverse its decision in September last year to withdraw the designation of several experienced IAEA inspectors. This decision continues to directly and seriously affect the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities effectively.
Chair
We continue to be concerned by the growth of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium.
Iran’s stockpile of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 60 per cent U-235 remains of real concern. We note the estimate that Iran has, by downblending, slightly reduced its overall stockpile of such material. However, this must not distract from the Agency’s advice that Iran has increased the rate at which it has been producing uranium enriched up to 60%. Iran has no credible civilian reason to produce uranium enriched to this level. This continues to send a concerning signal regarding possible intent and comes after a pattern of sustained and disturbing escalations in Iran’s nuclear program.
Chair
Also of concern is the Director General’s advice that the Agency has been unable to perform verification and monitoring activities under the JCPOA for three years.
Iran’s decision in 2021 to cease implementation of its monitoring and verification commitments under the JCPOA has broken continuity of knowledge over Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuge components, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate and has seriously undermined the IAEA’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s program.
We call on Iran to cooperate with the Agency on the installation of additional verification and monitoring equipment, consistent with the JCPOA, on servicing of existing equipment and on access to verification and monitoring data.
Chair
Australia fully supports the Director General’s efforts to preserve the Agency’s JCPOA verification and monitoring activities. We request that the Director General continue to report further developments on these matters to the Board and ask that GOV/2024/7 be made public.