Australia’s Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Remarks by HE Ambassador Ian Biggs
at ‘AUKUS: A Case Study about the Development of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards’
Vienna International Centre, 10 May 2024
Excellencies, colleagues
I was invited by my friend Ambassador Li to speak on AUKUS partners’ cooperation and our engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency Secretariat, during the introductory segment of this workshop.
You won’t be surprised to know that I had to think about the invitation, for it is unusual for one country to direct and organise, and I quote, ‘a platform for a case study’, targeted at another country’s sovereign endeavour and bilateral engagement with the IAEA.
But transparency is almost always good, and I really would be concerned if there was such an event about us, without us.
So, I decided to accept the invitation and address a number of fundamental points in connection with the topics which feature on the agenda of this workshop.
If you will allow me, I take this opportunity to explain:
- what AUKUS is, and what it isn’t;
- the legal framework, on the basis of which the IAEA is currently progressing consultations on naval nuclear propulsion separately with Australia and Brazil; and
- the importance of respecting the technical authority and independence of the IAEA in implementing its safeguards mandate.
First, what is AUKUS?
AUKUS is a technology and capability sharing partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, three countries with longstanding defence ties.
Australia is facing an extraordinarily rapid military build-up by others in our region, the Indo-Pacific. A build up that is occurring with limited transparency.
In this environment, we see enhanced capabilities as necessary for reducing the risk of conflict.
Through AUKUS, Australia is investing transparently to enhance our ability to make a credible contribution to maintaining strategic balance, and the rules and norms that have long supported stability in our region.
This is only one component of Australia’s overall approach, which also supports the region’s aspirations for economic development, critical infrastructure, and the clean energy transition.
Transparency, as well as strict and full adherence to our international obligations is key to our approach.
These have been and will continue to be core principles underpinning Australia’s participation in the AUKUS partnership.
And I hope that you will recognise that our approach has been fully consistent with these principles.
The AUKUS partnership’s centrepiece, which we call AUKUS Pillar One, is Australia’s planned acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
Australia has had submarines since the 1910s – 110 years. Through AUKUS, Australia will work to transition our existing fleet of six diesel-powered submarines to eight conventionally armed, nuclear‑powered submarines.
Importantly, cooperation on Pillar One – naval nuclear propulsion – is and will remain exclusively trilateral between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
It will remain distinct from the other, separate part of AUKUS, known as Pillar Two Advanced Capabilities, which translates cutting edge technology into practical capabilities.
Pillar Two, and any cooperation with additional partners on Pillar Two projects, will not include naval nuclear propulsion information, technology, or materials.
Naval nuclear propulsion itself is not a new capability, neither globally nor in our region.
There are over 40 countries worldwide that cumulatively operate nearly 500 naval submarines – around 135 of which are nuclear-powered.
We recognise that the acquisition of this capability by a non-nuclear-weapon state is new and carries with it a responsibility to ensure that the highest standard of non-proliferation is met.
I expect you will hear today that Australia’s acquisition of this capability on the basis of Article 14 is ‘controversial’.
This is a curious assertion.
So, what is Article 14?
Director General Grossi addressed this question very clearly in his statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board in June 2023, which I invite you all to revisit.
The DG stated:
- It is a provision originally approved and reflected in paragraph 14 of INFCIRC 153.
- It was developed with the specific intent to address the use of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under a safeguards agreement, whether produced domestically or imported, for naval nuclear propulsion.
- And it is part of the legal framework set out in safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of INFCIRC 153 and, as such, included in Australia’s bilateral CSA – and the other CSAs approved by the Board of Governors in the past 50 years – as well as the quadripartite safeguards agreement of Argentina and Brazil.
The DG then set out how, once relevant provisions had been invoked, the IAEA had worked methodically to develop approaches within the applicable legal frameworks, with Canada in 1988, Brazil since 2021 and Australia since 2023.
Of course, it is a process that involves complex technical matters, as the DG has acknowledged.
This process is about developing a robust safeguards and verification approach that ensures that the IAEA can continue to meet its technical objectives – no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activity.
The technical considerations will reflect factors that are specific to the naval nuclear propulsion program concerned.
So that it is fit-for-purpose, rather than one-size-fits-all.
But to question the applicability of Article 14, as a well-established treaty provision, simply because its application and implementation involve complex technical issues, risks going down a dangerous path.
In this context, I want to highlight that all Member States share an interest in protecting their fundamental right to engage bilaterally and in confidence with the Agency on the implementation of their safeguards agreements.
Which brings me to my final point on IAEA safeguards.
I was pleased to hear Ambassador Li’s reference to a commitment to preserving the nuclear non‑proliferation system.
Those words describe what lies at the heart of our collective efforts here in Vienna: to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation architecture of which the IAEA safeguards system is a fundamental pillar.
Over the system’s more than fifty-year history, through the changing technological and international landscape, the IAEA has worked continuously to adapt and direct its technical work to meet its practical goal of achieving safeguards objectives in the most effective way.
Member States have certainly contributed to these efforts and have employed a range of mechanisms over the years in doing so.
But colleagues, our constructive contribution, while important, must not extend to Member States’ seeking to direct the IAEA on how to do its work.
If we accept that the IAEA’s technical role is an integral part of the non-proliferation system, then it becomes our responsibility to ensure that any contribution we make as Member States respects the independence, mandate and technical authority of the IAEA.
In the context of naval nuclear propulsion, I recall the DG has specifically said that the IAEA has, and I quote:
- “significant experience in applying safeguards… to many types of facilities, including reactors using different types of fuel”; and
- “the necessary experience to develop the arrangements related to the use of nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion in accordance with the Statute and the relevant safeguards agreements”.
This is why Australia has expressed serious concern about references to ‘an intergovernmental process’, if it is intended to be a process subjecting the IAEA’s technical work to the political deliberations of Member States.
And at the risk of stating the obvious – all Member States share an interest in protecting the IAEA’s technical mandate, as we need to rely on its ability to carry out its mandate independently and impartially in these challenging times.
Please allow me to reiterate Australia’s commitment in relation to our naval nuclear propulsion program.
We are committed to concluding an arrangement under Article 14 that will enable the IAEA to continue to fulfil its technical objectives at all stages of Australia’s submarines’ lifecycle, and to provide confidence to the international community on the non-diversion of nuclear material.
We remain concerned that a preoccupation with dictating a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach to implementing IAEA safeguards might hamper the IAEA’s ability to meet its technical objectives.
In fact, given state-specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programs, we strongly doubt that such an approach would even be feasible for enabling the IAEA to achieve all of its technical objectives.
When our Article 14 arrangement comes before the Board of Governors, in the fullness of time, we expect it to be judged on its non-proliferation merits. In other words, on whether it enables the IAEA to fulfil its technical objectives.
Despite the history of our program attracting exaggerated rhetoric, I hope I have given you a sense of the well established legal and policy framework through which we are engaging with the IAEA.
Working transparently and within the framework of our legal agreements is fundamental to the non-proliferation regime we are all committed to protecting here in Vienna.
Once again, I want to express our sincere appreciation for your continuing interest in this matter.
We are very conscious of that interest and we will continue to listen and engage.
We have appreciated expressions of support and confidence that we, AUKUS partners and the IAEA, will get this right.
I also thank you for your messages of appreciation for our efforts to keep you informed.
In accepting Ambassador Li’s kind invitation, I was fully cognisant of my limited role in this forum, devised by another delegation, about my country’s sovereign endeavour, and my country’s bilateral engagement with the IAEA.
But in keeping with our spirit of openness – maybe even ‘excessive’ transparency – I decided to come and speak today.
We will continue to engage, regularly and transparently, with the IAEA and with the international community – here in Vienna and beyond.
We look forward to providing an update at the June Board and in other fora.
We continue to welcome constructive Board discussions on naval nuclear propulsion on the basis of reports by the DG.
We will continue to provide updates whenever there are substantive developments that fall within the Board’s vital remit.
Thank you to Ambassador Li and to you all.